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Abstract
This paper asks: What is the effect of government policy on output and inequality in an
environment with education and labor-supply decisions? The answer is given in a general
equilibrium model, consistent with the post 1960s facts on male wage inequality and labor supply
in the U.S. In the model, education and labor-supply decisions depend on progressive income
taxation, the education system, the social security system, and technology-driven wage
differentials. Government policies affect output and inequality through two channels. First, a
policy change leads to an asymmetric adjustment of working hours and savings of schooled and
unschooled individuals. Second, there is a redistribution of the workforce between schooled and
unschooled workers. Using a battery of proposed government policies, we demonstrate that skill
redistribution dampens the response of wage inequality to a policy change and ampliﬁes the
response of output by an additional 1 to 2 percent.
JEL classiﬁcation: H52, J31, J38
Bank classiﬁcation: Labour markets; Potential output; Productivity
Résumé
Les auteurs cherchent à cerner l’effet des politiques des pouvoirs publics sur la production et
l’inégalité dans une économie où les agents ont à choisir entre les études et le travail. Pour y
parvenir, ils recourent à un modèle d’équilibre général dont les résultats cadrent avec les faits qui
caractérisent à partir de 1961 l’inégalité des salaires et l’offre de travail dans la population
masculine aux États-Unis. Dans ce modèle, le choix entre les études et le travail est fonction de
plusieurs facteurs : la progressivité de l’impôt sur le revenu, le système éducatif, le régime de
sécurité sociale et les écarts salariaux attribuables à l’évolution de la technologie. Par ses
politiques, l’État inﬂue sur la production et l’inégalité de deux manières. Toute modiﬁcation
apportée à l’une de ses politiques induit d’abord un ajustement asymétrique du nombre d’heures
travaillées et de l’épargne parmi les hommes scolarisés et non scolarisés. Elle entraîne ensuite une
redistribution de la main-d’œuvre entre ces deux groupes de travailleurs. À partir de la simulation
de divers scénarios, les auteurs montrent que la hausse de la proportion des travailleurs scolarisés
atténue l’incidence d’un changement de politique sur les écarts salariaux mais ampliﬁe la réaction
de la production d’un ou de deux points de pourcentage.
Classiﬁcation JEL : H52, J31, J38
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Marchés du travail; Production potentielle; Productivité1. Introduction
This paper studies the e⁄ects of policy change on education choice, labor supply and wage
inequality. The paper consists of two parts. First, we build a theoretical framework that
is applicable for policy analysis. This is done by developing a general equilibrium model
consistent with the recent U.S. history of male labor hours and earnings. A main feature of
the model is its explicit treatment of individual choices to educate and work. In the second
part, we use our framework to study the e⁄ects of policy change on labor supply and the
education wage premium. The main question guiding our analysis is: What is the e⁄ect
of government policy, such as progressive income taxation, the education system, and the
social security system, on wage and income inequality in an environment with education and
labor-supply choice?
There are two distinct trends in the U.S. post-war aggregate data on labor supply. Trend
1, the education wage premium for men, measured as the ratio of median wage per hour of
college graduates to that for men with less than 4 years of college, increased from 1.43 in 1961
to 1.80 in 2002, a 26% change. Trend 2, the large increase in the relative wages across these
education groups was accompanied by the comparable increase in the relative total working
hours. The ratio of schooled to unschooled total hours worked tripled from 0.16 to 0.47.1
Remarkably, the main focus in the literature has been on the demand for working hours,
whereas the study of the supply across skill groups in the aggregate setting has received far
much less attention.2 In the U.S. data, most of the increase in the relative hours comes
from the increase in the number of individuals completing college. The fraction of college
graduates in the employed population more than doubled, increasing from 12.3% to 29.3%
from 1961 to 2002. In contrast, the mean workweek length for both skill groups changed
only a little in that period, decreasing from 44.5 to 43.2 hours per week for schooled, and
from 39.8 to 38.3 hours per week for unschooled workers. Therefore, individual choices of
attending school and working should be an inherent ingredient of any aggregate model of
labor supply and inequality.
In our model, each individual chooses the number of hours to work per week as well
as whether to obtain a college degree given his realized utility cost of attending college.
After the cost realization, an individual in the model decides to go to college, if the cost is
1See Eckstein and Nagypal (2004) and the survey by Katz and Autor (1999) for a detailed analysis of
macroeconomic trends in comensation and labor supply.
2A few examples include Heckman et al. (1998a), Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006), He (2006), Arpad (2004).
1smaller than the gain in terms of lifetime utility. The cost of going to college is assumed
to be decreasing in cognitive ability. Ceteris paribus, an individual with higher cognitive
ability faces a higher probability of ￿nishing college. Based on this feature, we determine a
parametric speci￿cation of the schooling cost to match the incidence of college completion
among young men in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979.
In the model, the education system is broadly de￿ned as the part of cognitive skills
acquired prior to the college decision, the time spent at college, and the amount of tuition paid
for college education. Individual supplies of hours and savings are a⁄ected by government
policy in the form of progressive income taxation, the retirement system, and the education
system, as well as by wage di⁄erentials driven by technology. We employ Statistics of Income
census data on individual tax returns and social security payments to obtain an empirically
plausible progressive-income tax function as well as retirement-bene￿t payments to retirees
in each education group.
Another key element of the model is the aggregate technology suggested in Krusell et al.
(2000), or KORV in short.3 KORV￿ s aggregate production function has technological progress
embodied in capital equipment. Capital equipment, in turn, is complementary with skilled
hours. Thus, a secular increase in the demand for equipment due to embodied technological
progress boosts the demand for skilled labor. KORV show that their aggregate technology
predicts the historical change in the education premium given the observed time series of
hours worked by schooled and unschooled individuals, and stocks of capital structures and
(quality adjusted) capital equipment. The general equilibrium framework developed in this
paper adopts an empirically plausible KORV technology to drive up the demand for schooled
working hours. Hence the key to the empirical success of our framework is to account for the
behaviour of the supply of aggregate hours and savings given relative wages and returns on
capital. We demonstrate that the calibrated model generates empirically plausible changes in
the supply of total hours and savings for each skill group in the U.S. from 1961 to 2002 given
the historical changes in neutral and skill-biased technological progress. This step completes
the development and testing of our framework.
In the second and main part of the paper, we employ the framework to analyze the e⁄ects
of public-policy changes on working hours, the number of individuals ￿nishing college, and
3KORV￿ s technology is a particular version of the popular theory that the positive secular comovement
in hours and compensation across groups with di⁄erent schooling is due to skill-biased technological change
(SBTC). According to this hypothesis, technological change favours the demand for skilled hours over un-
skilled hours, inducing the increase in both relative price and relative quantity of skilled labor. For details
see Katz and Murphy (1992) and references therein.
2the education premium. In particular, we emphasize two e⁄ects of government policies on
wage inequality and output.
First, a policy change has a di⁄erential e⁄ect on working hours and savings of schooled
and unschooled workers. This is typically due to a redistributive e⁄ect on income (for ex-
ample, after a reform of income taxation or the pension-bene￿t structure) or a change in
the education system (for example, after an increase in tuition subsidies). It leads to a
readjustment of the individual￿ s labor, consumption and savings decisions. A result of the
changed savings behavior is an adjustment of the amount of skill-intensive capital stock that
in￿ uences the demand for schooled hours and through those wage inequality. Second, the
resulting di⁄erence in the lifetime streams of consumption and leisure imply di⁄erent incen-
tives of attending college. The ensuing change in college enrollment will lead in the long
run to an adjustment in the fraction of schooled workers in the employed population. For
example, a higher relative supply of schooled hours puts a downward pressure on the wage
premium while boosting the level of output.
In order to quantify the e⁄ects of the change in government policy on labor supply and
wage inequality, we conduct a set of policy experiments mimicking some proposed policy
reforms. Our policy experiments can be categorized into three groups. First, we study the
income tax reforms that lower the level and progressivity of the income tax. Second, we look
at changes in the retirement system: (i) reforms that improve the viability of the pension
fund (increase in social security contributions and the increase in mandatory retirement
age); and (ii) reforms that a⁄ect the redistributive features of the pension system (a move
to proportional pension bene￿ts or a switch from a pay-as-you-go-system to a fully-funded
pension system). Finally, we investigate policies that improve the e¢ ciency of the schooling
system.
Two regularities stand out in these policy experiments. First, the long-run reallocation
of the workforce between unschooled and schooled jobs can be quite substantial, reaching on
several occasions a million or more workers within a 70-million male workforce. And second,
in the long run, the skill reallocation in most experiments reverses the initial e⁄ect on wage
inequality and leads to an additional 1 to 2% change in the level of output.
The rest of the paper preceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the main data facts. Section
3 presents the life-cycle model. In Section 4 the model is calibrated to the U.S. data in 1961
and 2002. We demonstrate the model￿ s success in matching key macroeconomic facts and
evaluate the importance of labor-supply and education choices for wage and working-time
3inequality. In Section 5 we subject the developed model to a sequence of policy experiments
to study the e⁄ect of government policy on schooling and inequality. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
In this section, we present data on working time, earnings per hour and productivity in the
U.S. from 1961 to 2002. We focus on long-run trends and mostly consider changes between
1961 and 2002.
2.1 Main facts for education premium and hours from 1961 to 2002
The data on working hours and compensation are based on the March supplement of the
Current Population Statistics (CPS) as provided by the IPUMS project.4 Following a con-
vention in the literature, we restrict our sample to males age 16 to 64. Before age 16, 85%
of men go to school and after 64 (the normal retirement age) the fraction of males working
decreases by about 80%.
The main reason for restricting our attention to males instead of the whole population
is that earnings per hour of women are catching up with those of males. This is especially
relevant for the less schooled in the 1980s.5 If we included women, this catching up would
add, we believe, a completely separate set of problems that is unrelated to the fundamentals
that drive the education-premium change.
The population in our sample is divided into two education groups: college graduates (or
￿schooled￿ ) and less-than college graduates (￿unschooled￿ ). This is a convenient division and
has been used before, for example by KORV. We de￿ne a college graduate as a person who
has completed at least 4 years of college. In contrast a less-than college graduate is a person
in the population with 0 years of schooling up to 3 years of college completed. A ￿ner division
of the group of less than college graduates does not alter our main facts. For example, the
group of persons with 1 to 3 years of college is much closer in terms of their earnings per
hour to the group of high-school graduates, than to the group of college graduates.6
4Appendices A and B provide detailed descriptions and transformations of the data.
5For a treatment of the gender gap we refer to Jones et al. (2003). Jones et al. point out that most of
the increase in market hours is due to married women entering the labor market and the decrease of the
gender-wage gap.
6Eckstein and Nagypal (2004) point out that there is a considerable di⁄erence between undergraduate
and graduate degree holders in terms of their earnings per hour. Data limitations do not allow us to pursue
subdivision of the group of college graduates.
4Given these groups, we are interested in documenting the evolution of average hours
worked per employed person, the number of workers, and earnings per hour for each education
group over the last four decades.
























where Li, Ei, N stand, respectively, for the total hours worked by group i, the number of
employed7 in group i, and the working age population. The following relationships hold:
LS + LU = L and ES + EU = E: We de￿ne as the workweek length of group i : li ￿ Li=Ei.
We refer to e ￿ ES=E as the fraction of schooled workers in the employed population. The
earnings per hour for each education group are measured by the (hours-weighted) median
earnings per hour of employed persons in the respective group. Using the median (as opposed
to the mean) helps us to circumvent the change in the CPS￿top coding procedure in the 1990s.
For convenience, we refer to the median earnings per hour as wage. Finally, we de￿ne the
education premium as the wage of a college graduate relative to that of a less than college
graduate.
From 1961 to 2002, the average hours worked by males decreased by about 9% (see Table
1). This is mostly due to a decrease in the fraction of employed in the male population, -6.5
percentage points. Even though the employment to population change for males is interesting,
it is dwarfed in size and importance by the changes that happened within the square brackets
in equation (1). Taking this observation into account, we focus on the compositional changes
of hours worked by employed persons. In particular, we highlight three main observations
for employed-male population for the period of 1961 to 2002:
(1) wages of schooled workers increased dramatically, by 26.1%, relative to those of un-
schooled workers,
(2) the fraction of employed schooled persons among all employed persons increased con-
siderably, by 17 percentage points,
(3) the workweek length of both schooled and unschooled employed persons decreased,
7We consider a person to be employed, if that person works more than zero hours per year.
5but only slightly: -1.4 hours per week (-2.9%) for schooled workers, and 1.5 hours per week
(-3.8%) for unschooled workers.8
Figure 1 contrasts changes in wages of college graduates and less-than college graduates
from 1961 to 2002. While the wage of schooled workers increased by three quarters from
$13.3 to $23.0, the wage of unschooled increased by only a quarter from $9.3 to $12.8. 9
Accordingly, the education premium increased from 1.43 in 1961 to 1.80 in 2002 (see Figure
2). The 26.1% increase in relative wages is sizeable, suggesting that a large part of the 47.7%
overall wage growth for males over this period was unevenly distributed.
The observed change in wages was accompanied by a large shift in working hours from
unschooled to schooled workers. The fraction of total hours supplied by the college graduates
has more than doubled over the last 40 years, reaching now one third of all hours worked
in the market place (see Figure 3). Almost all of the reallocation of total hours is due to a
change in the fraction of college graduates in the population and especially in the employed
population. From 1961 to 2002 the fraction of schooled in the employed population more
than doubled, increasing from 12% to 29%. In contrast, the workweek in each education
group stayed virtually unchanged. Figure 4 plots the workweek for the two groups from
1961 to 2002. Schooled individuals work more on average with 44.5 hours per week in 1961
compared to 39.8 hours per week for unschooled workers.10 Both time series observe a minor
fall by 2002 down to 43.2 and 38.3 hours per week, respectively, for schooled and unschooled
employed persons.
In Section 3, we present a model which can be used to account for the three highlighted
facts. In particular, the model has schooling and working-time choices. To generate the
transition from a low to a high fraction of schooled workers, we appeal to an idea devel-
oped by Katz and Murphy (1992) and later extended by KORV. The partial equilibrium
approach undertaken by KORV, attributes the skill reallocation to skill-biased technological
change which, in turn, is driven by capital-skill complementarity and capital-embodied tech-
nological change. In the next subsection, we describe the measurement of capital-embodied
technological progress in the data.
8The workweek length is measured as the average annual hours worked per employed person at the weekly
rate. We take the actual hours worked per week and the actual weeks worked per year into account in our
calcuation of annual hours.
9Unless otherwise noted, all quantities are in constant (year 2000) US dollars.
10We assume 100 hours available for work in a week.
62.2 Capital-embodied technological progress
The stock of capital equipment is reported in National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA)
tables and, for most of our sample period, the Bureau of Economic Analysis did not adjust
the stock of capital equipment to re￿ ect quality changes. Gordon (1990) conducts a hedonic
regression analysis to document the quality component of the growth of equipment. He ￿nds
that the quality of capital equipment increased by a factor of 4 from 1961 to 1982. KORV use
Gordon￿ s quality time series and extrapolate to cover their sample period. We use KORV￿ s
data and the methodology suggested in Greenwood et al. (1997) to extend Gordon￿ s time
series through 2002 (see Appendix B.2). Equations (2) and (3) capture the measurement and
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respectively, measured real stocks of capital structures and equipment (in consumption units),
Keq denotes the quality-adjusted stock and q is the quality-adjustment factor.
Figure 5 presents the two stocks from 1961 to 2002. Even though the stock of capital
structures grew by 136%, it is dwarfed by the 814% growth in the quality adjusted stock of
capital equipment11. The quality-adjustment factor q, which is equal to the relative price
of the quality-adjusted stock of equipment in terms of the consumption good, decreased by
a factor of four from 0.93 in 1961 to 0.26 in 2002. The decrease in the relative price of
equipment is used in the model in Section 3 as a stand-in for (the reciprocal of) capital-
embodied technological progress. It is a key force behind the increase in the demand for
schooled labor in the model.
11There are mainly two alternative measures of capital-embodied technological progress covering about the
same period that we consider: Cummins and Violante (2002) and Polgreen and Silos (2005). The later paper
provides two main series for capital-embodied technological progress, one that predicts strong growth during
the 1990s (similar to Cummins and Violante) and one with very week growth in quality-adjusted capital
equipment. We are closer to the more conservative estimate in capital-embodied technological growth for the
1990s but di⁄er only slightly from the other papers￿measures for the pre 1990 period.
73. Model
In this Section we present a general-equilibrium life-cycle model with education choice, labor
supply, and skill-biased technological change.
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical individuals. The diagram in Figure 6 summarizes
the life cycle of individuals in the economy. An individual is born at age 18.12 At birth he
faces a cost of education and decides whether or not to educate. If the individual decides to
educate, he spends 4 years at college. The individual starts working at 22, or 18 if he did
not go to college. All workers retire after turning 65 and die after 71.13
In this paper we focus on the economy in steady state. This implies that all aggregate
prices and quantities are constant. The steady state assumption is reasonable given our focus
on the secular change in the U.S. economy between two distant points of time - the years
1961 and 2002. Furthermore, we ￿nd that the main results are qualitatively robust even on
the transition path. We start by considering an individual￿ s choice of working time, savings,
and consumption conditional on the education choice. Afterwards, we present the education
choice problem.
3.1 Working time choice
An individual￿ s age is represented by an index a = 1;:::;I. The problem of an unschooled
individual is to choose lifetime sequences of consumption cU
a , working hours lU
a , and asset
holdings kU





















































a = 0; for 8a > Ir ; (6)
12We choose the age 18 as the beginning in the model since it is the average time for high-school graduation
and for most young males to begin college. This is in contrast to 16 years in the sample we considered in the
data. The di⁄erence in the data facts due to this age choice is minor and compensated by the comparability
of our numbers with standard publications, for example by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
13In the data reported in Arias (2004), the life expectancy at age 15 increased from 69 in 1961 to 75 in
2002. In the model, we choose constant life length of 71 to match relatively constant ratio of males over 64





Here (5) is the budget constraint of the unschooled at age a. He consumes, saves, receives
wage income at wage rate wU, asset returns at rate r, transfers from the government TRU
a
and divident payments ￿U
a . He faces tax payments as a (smooth) function T (￿) of her wage
and capital income, and pays a proportional consumption tax with the rate ￿c.14 Equation
(6) represents a no-working constraint for retirees, Ir is the retirement age, and (7) is the
constraint on the initial asset holdings.



















































la = 0; for 8a > Ir ; (10)
la = 0; for 8a ￿ Ie ; (11)





In addition to the budget (9), the retirement time (10) and initial asset holdings (13), indi-
viduals who go to college for Ie years cannot work (11), and pay tuition cost B (12) while
studying. To re￿ ect the time spent on studying in college, the time endowment of students
is reduced by an equivalent of a full-time workweek length, where I(a ￿ Ie) equals to 1 for
a ￿ Ie and zero otherwise. Note that all individuals face the same income tax function and
consumption tax rate.
To summarize, the factors that contribute to the di⁄erence in lifetime utility across ed-
ucation groups are: initial asset holdings, wages, income tax rates (if the tax function is
progressive), government transfers, tuition cost, and education time. We next proceed to the
problem of education choice faced by a newborn individual.
14We assume that capital income is taxed only as a part of personal income. In the U.S. the revenue from
taxes on capital as part of the personal income taxes is considerably larger than the corporate income tax
revenue. See, for example, Castaneda et al. (1998) or Altig and Carlstrom (1999) for the same approach.
93.2 Education choice
Newborn individuals face a cost of education d that has the following speci￿cation:
d(Q;z) = dmax ￿ ￿d (￿(Q) ￿ z) ; (14)
where Q and z are independent random draws from N (0;1), dmax 2 R++; ￿d 2 R++, and the
function ￿ : R ! R is continuous and increasing. We interpret Q as an individual￿ s cognitive
ability, and z is the residual (￿psychic￿ ) cost of education. As we show below, speci￿cation
(14) implies that cognitive ability is crucial for determining the size of the response of the
enrollment rate to a change in government policy. In contrast, the psychic cost of education
is irrelevant for the aggregate economy.
The education-choice problem of a newborn individual is:
V (k) = max
study / work
(
V S (k) ￿ d(Q;z) if study at 18
V U (k) if work at 18
)
: (15)
Given continuity of d(￿;￿) with respect to its second argument, for any realization of cognitive
ability Q, there exists a draw z￿ such that the individual is indi⁄erent between going to college
and working. Hence the education choice for an individual with realized ability Q and cost
draw z is to educate if d(Q;z) < d(Q;z￿), and work otherwise. We apply this decision rule
to derive the probability of going to college for an individual with cognitive ability Q:
Pr(d(Q;z) ￿ ￿V (k)) = F
￿





where F is the c.d.f. of N (0;1), and ￿V (k) ￿ V S (k) ￿ V U (k) is the di⁄erence in life-
time utility across two education groups. Notice that the probability of college completion is
increasing in cognitive ability, Q, and does not depend on the psychic cost, z. Hence, speci-
￿cation (14) with two random draws allows us to capture two aspects from the data on test
performance and educational attainment: (1) individuals with higher test performance have
(on average) a higher educational attainment; and (2) for any low (high) test performance,
there are individuals who have (have not) completed at least 4 years of college (see Section
4).
Equation (16) implies that the fraction of households that decide to educate in each











Equation (17) relates the enrollment rate to a change in government policy. A policy change
that has an asymmetric e⁄ect on lifetime streams of consumption and leasure of schooled
and unschooled individuals, alters the lifetime utility gap, ￿V (k). For an individual with
given cognitive ability Q, a higher (lower) gap in the lifetime stream of utility will increase
(decrease) that individual￿ s probability of completing college. On the aggregate, the size of
the response of the enrollment rate to a policy change depends on the change in the lifetime
utility gap and the distribution of education cost over the population, captured by the term
￿0(Q)F00(Q)
F0(Q) .15 The advantage of our approach is that we can infer this term directly from
the data by estimating function ￿(￿) using the data on test performance and educational
attainment (see Section 4).
Finally, cohorts in the model have equal size, 1=I, so the fraction of people ever enrolled
in college is
" = "aI : (18)






3.3 Bank￿ s problem
There is a competitive industry of banks that pool individuals￿savings in the form of asset
k and invest them in two types of physical capital: structures and equipment. Structures
are a generic form of physical capital, whereas equipment undergoes embodied technological
progress - a key source of rising demand for schooled labor in the model. The problem of the


































































Here Kst, Keq denote aggregate stocks of structures and equipment, rst, req are their re-
spective rental rates; ￿st, ￿eq are their respective depreciation rates; and q is the price of
equipment in terms of the consumption good (with the price of structures in terms of the
consumption good normalized to one).
3.4 Final good producing technology
We adopt the ￿nal goods producing technology from KORV. This technology admits both
the secular rise in relative wages and the rise in schooled hours (see the discussion in footnote
16). The production function F (￿) has four factors: aggregate stocks of capital equipment



























We constrain the parameters of the technology to guarantee two input relationships. Capital
equipment and labor services of schooled are complementary, which requires ￿ < 0. Total
hours of unschooled, on the other hand, are substitutes with the capital-skill aggregate,
implying ￿ > 0. Technological progress is embodied in capital equipment and is the source
of increasing demand for hours of college graduates in the model. The remaining parameters
include: share parameters ￿, ￿u, ￿k 2 [0;1], total factor productivity A 2 R++, and the
labor-e¢ ciency parameter AS 2 R++.
Under competitive factor markets, rental prices of structures, rst, equipment, req, and
























































































































According to (26), the education premium is ceteris paribus negatively related to relative
total hours (note that ￿ ￿ 1 < 0). Hence, for our model to be consistent with the positive
secular movement of relative wages and hours (Fact 2 in Section 2), capital equipment Keq
must grow fast enough relative to schooled hours (in e¢ ciency units), ASLS. In our data,
the ratio of quality-adjusted capital equipment stock to total schooled hours indeed increases
by a factor of four from 1961 to 2002. Therefore, the KORV technology, as opposed to other
standard aggregate technologies, is consistent with the secular increases in relative wages and
hours.16
16The education premium derived from a Cobb-Douglas technology is
wS





so that the education premium and relative total hours are negatively related.
If the CES technology is symmetric (see Katz and Murphy (1992)), relative wages and hours are (as in the
133.5 Government
The government in the model collects tax revenues, pays for government expenditures G and

















































































The part of the income tax revenue due to retirement contributions is distributed among the
retirees. In the benchmark version of the model, per-capita transfers are equalized, implying
a redistribution of retirement payments in favour of unschooled retirees. This captures the
redistributive feature of the pay-as-you-go pension system currently in place for example in
the United States. We consider other speci￿cations of the retirement system in Section 5.
3.6 Market clearing and equilibrium
There are 4 markets in the model: capital-rental markets, and markets for labor services of




































with the ￿nal-goods market clearing by Walras law.
Cobb-Douglas case) negatively related, unless labor e¢ ciency AS grows fast enough:
wS







KORV argue that the growth in labor e¢ ciency required to account for facts 1-3 is implausibly large: 11%
per year, or a factor of 25 over 30 years.










and prices r,rst,req,wS,wU such that,
given prices, as well as the relative price of equipment q, productivity A, tuition cost N,
income tax function T (￿), government purchases G, and initial asset holdings kX, the alloca-
tion solves the problems of unschooled individuals (8)-(7) and schooled individuals (8)-(12);
education-choice equations (17)-(19) are satis￿ed; input prices are equal to marginal products
(21)-(24); and all markets clear (28)-(30).
4. Model and the U.S. data
This section consists of two parts. We ￿rst calibrate the model to key characteristics in the
U.S. data from 1961 to 2002. Then we investigate the capability of the benchmark model to
match facts 1 through 3 outlined in Section 2: increase in the education premium, rise in the
fraction of college graduates, and slight decrease in the workweek length. We emphasize the
role of education choice and labor supply together with productivity (embodied and neutral)
for matching these facts.
4.1 Calibration
Our calibration proceeds in three steps. We ￿rst calibrate the parameters of the aggregate
technology following KORV. Then, we estimate the income tax functions. And ￿nally, we
calibrate preference parameters and parameterize and estimate the cost of education.
4.1.1 Technology
As noted in the previous Section, KORV￿ s aggregate technology in combination with com-
petitive factor markets implies that the education premium is a (nonlinear) function of two
ratios: total hours of schooled workers per total hours of unschooled workers, LS
LU, and equip-
ment per total schooled hours (in e¢ ciency units), Keq
ASLS. The education premium function
contains six parameters: factor demand elasticities ￿, ￿, share parameters ￿, ￿u, ￿k, and the
labor-e¢ ciency parameter, AS. We choose parameter values to match six moments in the
U.S. data: the 1961 level and 1961 to 2002 growth of the ratio of total wage income of schooled
and unschooled workers, the 1961 level and 1961 to 2002 growth of the labor-income share,
the ratio of stocks of capital structures and equipment in 1961; and real GDP in 1961.17
17A convenient feature of the calibration procedure is that input elasticities ￿ and ￿ are invariant with
respect to units of (quality adjusted) stock of capital equipment. To see this, let ￿ scale the capital equipment





15Table 3 contains the calibrated parameter values. We borrow values for capital depreciation
rates ￿st, ￿eq directly from KORV, 0.05 and 0.125; respectively. The initial asset holdings of
individuals are zero.
After calibrating the parameter values of the aggregate technology, we use NIPA data
for output and capital inputs as well as CPS data for hours worked by education group to
infer the change in the neutral productivity A from 1961 to 2002. We ￿nd that neutral
productivity increases by 50%, or about 1% per year.
The calibration procedure identi￿es the aggregate technology that is consistent with sec-
ular movements of relative prices and aggregate quantities of labor and capital in the U.S.
from 1961 to 2002. By construction, the ability of our general equilibrium model to match
the observed trend in the education premium depends on its ability to match the historic
levels of aggregate supplies of total hours and savings given wages and rental rates, changes
in exogenous factors (such as productivity, taxes, etc.) and the speci￿cation of aggregate
technology. At the end of this Section, we show that the complete model, when calibrated,
￿ts the data well. We then use the model in Section 5 to investigate (a) the importance
of education choice and labor supply for wage inequality; and (b) the e⁄ects of alternative
government policies on schooling, supply of hours and welfare.
4.1.2 Income tax function and retirement bene￿ts
Let y denote an individual￿ s taxable income. The e⁄ective average income tax rate T (y)=y,
denoted by ￿ (y), has three components: federal ￿fed (y), state ￿st (y) and social security tax
rates ￿ss (y). Given data availability, we ￿rst estimate each component separately and then
combine them to obtain the estimated income tax rate:













































We thank Rui Castro for bringing this point to our attention. Derivations are available upon request.
16The federal tax function is approximated by a polynomial of degree ￿ve. The polynomial
form is easy to estimate and it ￿ts fairly well to both macro and micro data on income tax
rates 18:





The parameters are determined using micro data from the Statistics of Income (SOI) as
provided by the Internal Revenue Services. To estimate parameters a0 through a5 we use
Internal Revenue Service data on individual federal income tax returns in 1961 and 2002. We
regress the average tax rate for each person on her respective income.19 Table 4 provides the
estimated parameter values. To obtain the state tax rates, we use the State Tax Handbooks
for 1964 and 2002 to ￿nd the states￿statutory tax schedules. From those we take the highest
tax rates for each state and determine a population weighted average, txst. This is then used












For the social security tax, we make use of data provided by the U.S. Social Security
Agency on social security tax rates and the social security tax base to determine the propor-
tional rates. There are some social security taxes that appy to all levels of income above a
certain minimum, y. The respective tax rate is denoted by txother SS. This is not the case for
social security taxes that are counted towards the retirement fund. There exists an upper
bound on income, ￿ yRetirement; up to which the statutory retirement tax rate, txRetirement, is
applicable. All income above this bound is not taxed by the retirement part of social security.
This leads to a lower average social security tax rate for persons with income above ￿ yRetirement.
These facts, taken together, lead to the following formula for the social security tax rate:
￿ss (y) =
(
0:7 (txRetirement + txother SS)
0:7 (txRetirement ￿
￿ yRetirement
y + txother SS)






Note that the factor of 0.7 is required since social security taxes only apply to wage income,
which is around 70% of the total income of an individual.
18See, for example, Gouveia and Strauss (1994).
19We thank the IRS and especially Michael Weber for providing us with the results of the regression
analysis. Throughout the determination of the tax function we work with real (year 2000) U.S. dollars.
20The number 20,000 refers to year 2000 U.S. dollars and captures the approximate level of income after
which the state taxes are no longer progressive.
17Finally, we smooth out the resulting function ￿ (y) by a polynomial of degree ￿ve in order
to ensure countinuous di⁄erentiability of the tax function. It turns out that the di⁄erence
between the smooth approximation and the original is quite small. 21
Figure 8 plots the estimated e⁄ective average income tax rates as a function of disposable
income for 1961 and 2002. Two features stand out. First, the level of the income tax function
for 2002 is virtually the same as in 1961. To illustrate this we consider college-graduates￿
income tax. The median income of college graduate in 2002 was around 60 thousand US$
2000. So, the average tax rate for a median-income college graduate was 20.7%, whereas in
1961 it would have been 17.1%. Second, the income tax schedule is fairly progressive. In
2002 the average tax rate of the median income unschooled individual was 17.5%, which is
lower than the average income tax rate of a median income schooled person, 20.7%. When
we consider tax policies in Section 5, we ￿nd that the progressivity of income taxation is an
important factor for an individual￿ s decision to go to college, and it has a large impact on
the education premium.
In the model, tax revenues are used to pay for government expenditures and lump-sum
transfers to workers and retirees. In the NIPA, the government expenditures (plus net ex-
ports) to GDP ratio decreased from 25% in 1961 to 16% in 2002. In the benchmark model,
the revenue from the social security tax is distributed equally among the retired population
in a lump-sum fashion. This way of redistribution captures the pay-as-you-go pension bene￿t
system in the U.S. well. It favours income-poor unschooled relative to income-rich schooled
retired individuals. The residual budget balance is distributed equally among all workers.
4.1.3 Preferences and education cost
The discount factor ￿ is 0.96 so that the interest rate is 4%. We determine the share of
leisure in the utility function, ￿, by matching the workweek of college graduates in 1961
at 44.5 hours per week. The parameter value, 1.78, is consistent with values found in the
empirical literature.22
21The procedure described in this subsection is based on the analysis of Current Population Statistics
data on taxes for the year 2002. As an alternative, we estimated a ￿fth order polynomial for the combined
federal, state, and social security tax rates directly from the CPS. The di⁄erence for the estimated income
tax function is small. We would have prefered to use the CPS-micro approach both for the year 1961 and
the year 2002, but the CPS does not provide tax data for the 1960s. To preserve consistency, we decided to
use the approach outlined in the text.
22We rescale dollars in the model to 2002 dollars in the data. The scale parameter is picked to match the
average tax rate faced by the median income individual in the data in 1961 at 15.5%.
18To calibrate the utility cost of education, we employ data on the cognitive ability test
performance of individuals in The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). It
is a nationally representative panel of more than 12,000 men and women who are between the
age of 14 and 22 when they are ￿rst interviewed. In 1980, 94% of the NLSY79 respondents
took the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) - a series of tests measuring
knowledge and skill in 10 areas, ranging from general science and knowledge of mathematics
to word knowledge and paragraph comprehension (see Appendix C for details). A composite
Armed Forces Quali￿cations Test score (AFQT) was constructed for each youth based on
selected sections of the ASVAB. Taking the AFQT score as a good indicator of cognitive
ability, we use the score distribution of respondents in the NLSY79 to estimate the ￿(￿)
function that relates an individual￿ s cognitive ability in the model to their utlity cost of
education (see equation (14)).23
For our purposes, we restrict the sample to white males who took the ASVAB tests and
who were not in college in 1979. We then de￿ne standardized test scores by taking out age-
speci￿c weighted means from the raw AFQT scores and normalize by the (weighted) standard













i is the raw (de-meaned by age) AFQT score and Qi is the standardized AFQT
score for individual i.
For each individual in this sample we document his highest completed grade as of May 1,
1988. Let HGRi be equal to 1 if individual i￿ s highest completed grade was 4 or more years
in college, and 0 otherwise. We estimate the parameters of the following weighted probit
equation:





where the probit is de￿ned as vi = F ￿1 (Pr(HGRi) = 1), and F is the c.d.f. of a standard
normal random variable. Table 5 contains regression results. Given the normality assump-
tions on cognitive ability in the model, the right hand side of (32) is a third-order polynomial
approximation of function ￿(￿). For the estimated parameter values hi, Figure 7 plots the
probability of going to college conditional on the test score. According to our estimates,
an individual with the median score (65 AFQT points, or 0.4 standardized AFQT points)
23Due to limited availability of the data, we assume in our analysis that the distribution of cognitive ability
is invariant between 1961 and 2002.
19completes college with probability 17%, whereas this probability for an individual in the 75th
percentile (86 AFQT points, or 1.4 standardized AFQT points) ￿nishes college almost half
the time, 46%. According to equation (17), the area below the probability line (weighted by
the standard normal distribution) gives the enrollment rate. The shape of the probability
line (re￿ ecting the shape of function ￿(￿)) determines the magnitude of adjustment of the
enrollment rate in response to a change in government policy.
It only remains to calibrate two parameters of the cost function (14), dmax and ￿d. We
use equations (17) and (18) relating education cost and the utility di⁄erence between two
education groups to the fraction of college graduates. To infer the utility di⁄erence consistent
with the observed macro data, we calculate the steady state equilibria such that the model
matches the fraction of schooled workers and quality adjusted capital equipment stock in the
data in 1961 and 2002.
This procedure gives us two pairs of enrollment rates and utility-di⁄erence values, which
together with the function ￿(￿) are plugged into (17) and (18) to infer the values for dmax and
￿d (see Table 3).24
Finally, we take pure monetary tuition cost from the data. These cost include tuition
and fees of full time undergraduate students and are taken from the College Board￿ s pub-
lication ￿Trends in College Pricing 2005￿ . The numbers supplied are split into public and
private college cost. To get an average rate, we weighted the average of the private and
public universities student tuition and fees series by their respective fractions of students,
(0.2 tuitionprivate + 0.8 tuitionpublic): We ￿nd that the ratio of average annual college tuition
to median annual wage income of an unschooled worker is 0.16 for 1961 and increased to 0.37
in 2002.
4.2 How well does the model match the data?
We ￿rst ask how well does the model capture the observed changes in the education premium,
fraction of college graduates and average working time, given the estimated education cost
function (14) and given the change in exogenous factors, reported in Table 6. The driving
force of wage inequality is skill-biased technological change re￿ ected in the dramatic fourfold
fall in the price of capital equipment from 0.96 in 1961 to 0.26 in 2002. Neutral productivity
increased by a solid 50%. A contribution of this paper is to study factors a⁄ecting the supply
of schooled working time. These factors in the model include progressive income taxes (see
24We assume that the intercept in (32) is included in the calibrated value of parameter dmax.
20Figure 8), consumption taxes (-1.7 percentage points change), government purchases (plus
net exports) to GDP (-37% change), and tuition relative to labor income of unschooled (131%
increase).
Table 7 compares simulation results for the benchmark model and the data in 1961 (rows
1 and 2) and 2002 (rows 3 and 4).
By virtue of our calibration exercise, the success of the 1961 model simulation to match
the data hinges on the model￿ s ability to account for the average time of unschooled workers.
The model is relatively successful in predicting 38.5 hours per workweek for an unschooled
individual, which is close to 39.8 hours per week in the data. As a result, the predicted
education premium of 1.42 almost matches the number in the data, 1.43.
The model for 2002 is quite close to the data, too. It predicts an increase in the education
premium up to 1.75 (compared to 1.80 in the data), accounting for 89% of the observed
change. It does well in predicting the large increase in the fraction of schooled working hours
and a modest decrease in the average hours worked. The fraction of schooled workers in
the 2002 model increases to 26.7% (compared to 29.3% in the data), whereas working time
of schooled (unschooled) workers decreases somewhat to 40.7 and 32.6 respectively in the
model (43.2 and 38.3 in the data).25 We summarize that the calibrated model is successful
in generating the main labor facts 1 through 3 presented in Section 2.
To understand the importance of education choice and productivity for wage and working
time inequality in the model, we conduct a series of counterfactual experiments. In each
experiment, we simulate a steady state equilibrium for the year 2002 keeping one of the
exogenous factors at its 1961 level. We compare outcomes for this counterfactual model
to those of the 2002 benchmark model. If the di⁄erence between the outcomes of the two
experiments is large, then the factor that was ￿shut down￿in the counterfactual simulation
is interpreted to be important for wage inequality and education choice. Table 8 provides the
results of simulations in which the productivity change or the education decisions are shut
down.
When productivity (embodied and neutral) are at the 1961 level, any change in hours
and in the number of workers is driven by the remaining factors from Table 6: income
25The larger decrease in average hours worked is due to our choice to not increase the life length in the
model to keep the fraction of retirees in the population constant. The somewhat lower level of average hours
in the model relative to the data has little impact on the results of policy experiments conducted in Section
5.
21and consumption taxes, government expenditures and tuition costs. Tuition a⁄ects only a
small fraction of population, and the rest of the changing factors experienced relatively small
changes from 1961 to 2002. Hence, in this experiment all the moments are close to the 1961
level: the fraction of schooled workers is 10.7%, average hours are 42.8 and 35.3 for schooled
and unschooled workers, the capital-output ratio is 2.52, output level (relative to output level
in the benchmark 1961 model) is 0.91 and, ￿nally, the education premium is 1.48. Hence,
in the model without productivity changes, there is little to no changes relative to the 1961
benchmark model. One interesting ￿nding is that neutral (in addition to capital-embodied)
technological progress has a large impact on the schooling rate and the stock of equipment.
Subsequently, it also accounts for some of the change in education premium.
In another experiment, we consider a world where the supply of schooled individuals is
completely inelastic and thus the schooling rate cannot change from its 1961 level. This might
be seen as a country that has problems to increase its university capacities, has restrictions
on university access, or the schooling system is incabable of providing more than a bare
minimum of the population with the opportunity to attend college. In this case, the increase
in demand for capital equipment and schooled labor is not accompanied by an increase in
the supply of schooled workers. As a result, the education premium skyrockets to 2.38. This
increase is 36% higher than the 2002 benchmark model and 68% higher than the 1961 level.
The workweek lengths of schooled and unschooled workers only see an approximately 1 hour
increase. Scarce supply of schooled hours decreases the demand for capital equipment due
to capital-skill complementarity in the production technology. The stock of equipment is
half of that in the benchmark 2002 model. To summarize, education choice, in addition to
technological change, is critical in accounting for the change in the education premium and
schooled hours.
5. The e⁄ects of government policy on schooling and
inequality
In this Section, we study the importance of public policy (income taxes, social security taxes,
retirement bene￿ts, tuition subsidies, etc.) in shaping secular changes in the education
decisions, labor supply, the accumulation of physical capital, and the education premium.
After having documented the overall success of the model in generating the main macro
facts, we turn to the analysis of the e⁄ects of alternative social policies on education choice,
the education premium and the output level. We group our policy experiments in three
22categories. First, we study income tax reforms that lower the level and progressivity of the
income tax. Second, we look at changes in the retirement system: (i) reforms that improve
the viability of the pension fund (increase in social security contributions and the increase
in mandatory retirement age); and (ii) reforms that a⁄ect the redistributive features of the
pension system (a move to proportional pension bene￿ts or a switch from a pay-as-you-go
system to a fully-funded pension system). Finally, we derive consequences of policies that
improve the e¢ ciency of the schooling system, such as those leading to higher test scores.
Our focus will be on two e⁄ects of policy change that distinguish our analysis from
previous studies. Both of these e⁄ects turn out to be important in shaping responses of
output and inequality to government policy reforms. The two e⁄ects di⁄er by the timing of
their impact on the fraction of schooled workers in the economy. The fraction of schooled
workers is a moving average of school enrollment rates over four or ￿ve decades. So we will
think of the medium-run e⁄ect as the one occuring within one or two decades after a policy
change, so that the response of the enrollment rate is not yet fully transpired into the fraction
of schooled workers in the economy. In the medium run, there is a dispropotionate response
of working hours and savings of schooled individuals and those of unschooled individuals.
This di⁄erence is due to (i) redistribution of income under progressive income taxation and
the incumbent pension system, and (ii) the change in demand for schooled hours due to the
change in capital accumulation (stemming from capital-skill complementarity). In the long
run, the fraction of educated persons adjusts to the policy change. Our policy experiments
will demonstrate that the long-run reallocation of total hours from unschooled to schooled
workers often has a dampening e⁄ect on wage inequality and an amplifying e⁄ect on the level
of output.
5.1 Income tax reforms
Our ￿rst set of experiments centers around tax reforms.
In the ￿rst experiment, the progressive income tax function is replaced with a (revenue-
neutral) proportional income tax rate. This reform is akin to the ￿fundamental￿￿ at-tax
reform proposed by Hall and Rabushka (1995), in which the marginal tax rate on income
above a certain threshold is ￿ at. Life-cycle models of wage and income inequality typically
predict positive e⁄ects of such a reform on the level of output and capital accumulation,
a small e⁄ect on average working hours, as well as ambiguous e⁄ects on wage and income
inequality.26
26Positive e⁄ects on output and savings range from small (~1%) in Heckman et al. (1998b) to large (~10%)
23In the experiment, the level of the ￿ at-tax rate is equal to the tax rate faced by the mean
income individual in the 2002 benchmark model, so that the tax reform is revenue neutral (see
Table 9). The marginal tax rates are lower for both income groups, and more so for schooled
workers. The reduction of marginal tax rates has positive e⁄ects on the workweek and savings.
The average working time of unschooled workers goes up by 1.6 hours per week. Schooled
workers also work more but only by an hour per week. The smaller e⁄ect on schooled workers,
whose time is compensated at a higher wage rate, is due to the income e⁄ect. Furthermore,
lower marginal tax rates on the capital part of individual￿ s income encourages savings: the
capital-output ratio increases from 2.50 to 2.55. Higher level of capital equipment, in addition
to increasing output by 4%, boosts the demand for schooled hours. The wage rate of schooled
workers goes up by almost a dollar, whereas wages of unschooled workers experience almost
no change. This drives up the wage premium from 1.75 to 1.77 in the medium run.27 Income
inequality also rises, measured by the Gini coe¢ cient applied to taxable income, from 0.249
to 0.263.
The positive income e⁄ect of the tax cut and higher wages for schooled hours increase
the bene￿ts of schooling. They induce a larger fraction of the population to enroll in school.
In the long run, the fraction of schooled workers goes up by 2 percentage points, whereas
the workweek length stays virtually unchanged. A larger supply of total hours of schooled
workers and a smaller supply of unschooled hours, in turn, reduce the compensation of
schooled workers relative to unschooled workers, bringing the education premium from 1.77
down to 1.71. Income inequality also falls from 0.263 in the medium run to 0.256. Hence,
the wage inequality after the reform is lower than before the reform with schooled wages
unchanged and unschooled wages higher by about half a dollar than before the reform. The
long-un income inequality remains higher than before the reform, re￿ ecting a faster accrual
of the capital income. Finally, the increase in the fraction of more productive (schooled)
workers boosts output by an additional 2%. To sum up, in the long run after the ￿ at-tax
reform, changes in the skill composition of the workforce decrease wage inequality, mitigate
the increase in income inequality and lead to a positive e⁄ect on output.
In the second experiment, tax rates are lowered proportionally by 19% (that is, average
in Ventura (1999) and Altig et al. (2001). The ￿ at income tax reform decreases the education premium
in Heckman et al. (1998b), and Gini earnings inequality in Castaneda et al. (1998). The reform increases
the Gini income inequality in Heckman et al. (1998b), Altig and Carlstrom (1999). In Ventura (1999) the
distributions of earnings and income become more concentrated after the reform. In Diaz-Gimenez and
Pijoan-Mas (2006) the e⁄ects on earnings and income inequality are small.
27Note that the level of the stock of capital structures is irrelevant for education premium in the model,
see equation (26).
24and marginal tax rates for all incomes are multiplied by 0.81).28 This reform is comparable
to the ￿ at-tax reform in the sense that after the reform the mean income individual faces
the same marginal income tax rate of 19.5%. The overall results turn out to be very close
to those of the ￿ at-tax reform (see Table 9), lower level of marginal tax rates encourages
individual￿ s labor supply and savings, leading to the increase in output, capital-output ratio
and, via capital-skill complementarity, to higher wage inequality in the medium run. The
incentives to attend school increase, but not as much as in case of ￿ at taxes, since the income
tax after the cut is still progressive. In the long run, the fraction of schooled workers goes
up by 1.6 percentage points, bringing the wage premium down to 1.72 and raising output by
an extra 1%. Income inequality is close to its level prior the reform, 0.246.
We conclude that a proportional 19% tax cut yields implications for inequality and po-
tential output that are quantitatively very similar to those due to a switch from progressive
to ￿ at income taxes.
5.2 Change in retirement system
Many European countries as well as the United States, Canada, and Japan experience popu-
lation aging. For countries with a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) retirement system, like the United
States, this can lead to severe problems of retirement funding in the near future. Various
ways out of the impending retirement fund imbalance have been suggested and in some cases
tried: increasing the full-bene￿t retirement age (this has been done in the United States,
Germany, and Italy among others), increasing contributions to the pension fund or cutting
retirement bene￿ts. More drastic reforms of the pension system aim at reducing or eliminat-
ing the redistribution of income from income-rich to income-poor retirees. Examples of such
reforms include decreasing the redistiribution of retirement bene￿ts from higher- to lower-
income retirees, or switching from a PAYG to a fully-funded retirement system (as suggested,
for example, in Prescott (2004)).
A main source of population aging in most economies is a high proportion of individuals
born after the World War II (￿baby-boomers￿ ), who are on the verge of retirement. According
to U.S. interim projections released by the U.S. Census Bureau, the ratio of male population
above age 64 to male population above age 16 will increase from 13.6% in 2000 to 22.4% in
2030.29 To capture population aging in the model, we increase the life length from 71 to 78,
28A similar in magnitude tax cut was instituted in the U.S. by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See Altig and
Carlstrom (1999) for the analysis in a general equiliubrium life-cycle framework. In our model, the tax cut
is ￿nanced by higher lump-sum taxes on workers.
29U.S. Census Bureau, "State Interim Population Projections by Age and Sex: 2004 - 2030",
25which increases the fraction of retirees to working age population from 13.0% to 23.0%.
The size of the retirement bene￿ts per retiree in the 2002 steady state (expressed as a
fraction of the average lifetime wage income) equals 0.21 for schooled and 0.45 for unschooled
retired individuals. In the 2030 steady state, the fraction of retirees in the population is higher
and, because of that, the bene￿ts per retired worker are lower at 0.10 and 0.21 respectively
(see Table 10). We consider two reforms that are intended to o⁄set the decrease in the
size of individual retirement bene￿ts due to population aging. Speci￿cally, the revenues of
the pension fund are increased by raising the social security tax rate or by increasing the
mandatory retirement age. We compare the e⁄ect of these two reforms to the 2030 steady
state.
First, we increase contributions to the pension fund by 7 percentage points. This reform
increases the average tax rates by 7 percentage points without a⁄ecting the marginal tax
rates. The resulting income e⁄ect discourages savings and labor e⁄ort as the capital-output
ratio and average hours go down moderately. Wage and income dispersion change little,
whereas potential output falls by 3%. This reform also decreases incentives to educate by
increasing the share of retirement bene￿ts in wage income of unschooled workers faster than
the share for schooled workers (0.21 to 0.45 for unschooled, 0.10 to 0.22 for schooled workers).
In the long run, the fraction of schooled employed falls from 29.7% to 28.7%.
In the alternative experiment, we increase the mandatory retirement age from 64 to 70.
This brings the fraction of retired workers in the population back to its 2002 level of 13%.
Hence, as in the previous case, bene￿ts per a retired person increase to the same level as
in the 2002 steady state with life expectancy at age 71 and retirement after 64 years. A
longer working age and a shorter life after retirement reduce incentives to save and work.
The capital per output goes down from 2.64 to 2.57, the workweek length declines by about
3 hours for both groups, and output declines by 9% in the medium run. The resulting capital
equipment stock, average hours worked and output are at about the same levels as in the
benchmark 2002 steady state. The fraction of schooled employed falls to 28.9%, similar to
the ￿rst experiment. The overall e⁄ect on wage inequality is close to zero. The income
distribution is more concentrated since the growth of individual income over the lifetime is
smaller.
The next two experiments are aimed at eliminating the redistribution from schooled
(income-rich) retirees to unschooled (income-poor) retired individuals that is present in the
<http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/projectionsagesex.html>.
26current U.S. retirement system. In the ￿rst 2002 experiment, pension bene￿ts, as a fraction
of wage income, are equalized for all retirees, keeping total retirement payments the same
(see Table 11). After the reform the retirement bene￿ts to wage income ratio increases from
0.21 to 0.34 for schooled retirees, and decreases from 0.45 to 0.34 for unschooled retirees.30
The reform has a very small e⁄ect on working time and savings, since the redistribution of
lump-sum bene￿ts generates a negligible income e⁄ect. For example, the ratio of lifetime
retirement payments to lifetime wage income increases by only 2.2 percentage points for
schooled individuals and decreases by 1.6 percentage points for unschooled individuals. The
reform only marginally improves the incentives to attend college as the fraction of schooled
workers goes up to 26.9% in the long run. The e⁄ects on output and inequality are also
small.
Finally, in our last experiment, the PAYG retirement system is substituted with a fully-
funded system, in which each retired individual saves for his own retirement. The reform
a⁄ects the economy via two distinct channels. First, it stops the redistribution of the retire-
ment income from schooled to unschooled workers. We know from the previous experiment
that this channel is weak. Second, a switch to the fully-funded retirement system implies
a positive income e⁄ect on average hours worked and savings due to the elimination of the
social security part of the income tax. Schooled and unschooled workers under the fully-
funded system work by 3/4 and 1 hour more per week than under the PAYG system, and
the capital-output ratio boosts to 2.59. As shown in Table 11, the model implies a strong
long-run increase in the fraction of schooled workers to 27.7, and the reversal of the medium-
run increase of the education premium, from 1.77 to 1.74. The reallocation of skill o⁄sets the
initial e⁄ect on income inequality due to higher savings rate and higher labor supply leading
to no change in the dispersion of income, with the Gini coe¢ cient hovering at 0.244 in the
long run. Most importantly, output level rises by 4% in the medium run, and by 5% in the
long run.
To summarize, the reforms of the retirement system aiming at maintaining the viability of
the pension fund, discourage incentives to work, save and educate, leading to output losses.
They typically do not a⁄ect wage inequality and slightly decrease income inequality. Quite
opposite results are found when eliminating the PAYG retirement system altogether and
letting agents save for their own retirement. This reform in￿ uences the economy not through
30The bene￿t-earnings ratios estimated by the social security agency at
<http://www.socialsecurity.gov/cgi-bin/bene￿t6.cgi> for persons with pre-retirement income of 20,000 and
40,000 U.S. dollars in 2006 (roughly corresponding to earnings of unschooled and schooled individuals in
2002) are 0.42 and 0.31. The redistribution of the respective bene￿ts in the model, 0.45 and 0.21, is higher
than in the data, implying a conservative approach in our redistribution experiments.
27abolition of the redistribution of pension bene￿ts, but through lower average tax rates. Long
after the reform, wage inequality decreases and income dispersion stays unchanged.
5.3 E¢ ciency of the schooling system
In the ￿nal part of our policy section, we consider policies that directly a⁄ect the e¢ ciency
of the education system. Such policies engage ￿nancial and non-￿nancial factors to improve
the incidence of college completion, e.g. tuition subsidy, shortening schooling time, higher
grading standards, administration of graduation exams, rasing the amount of homework.
In the ￿rst experiment, college tuition is fully subsidized. Many European countries had
full subsidization of higher education for many decades with the goal of providing equal access
to schooling and reducing wage inequality. In the model, this reform increases disposable
income of schooled individuals by removing the necessity to pay tuition costs. Higher income
implies a shorter workweek by 1 hour (see Table 12). In the medium run, the lower supply of
total hours of schooled workers leads to an increase in their wages relative to the wages of the
unschooled workers, and also to a slight increase in hours worked of unschooled workers. Thus
in the medium run, subsidizing tuition decreases inequality in hours worked and increases
wage inequality, whereas the e⁄ects on aggregate output and savings are very small. In
the long run, the fraction of schooled workers goes up to 39.7%, a swing of 2 million male
workers, taking today￿ s working population as the benchmark. A surge in the supply of
schooled workers overturns the initial increase in wage and income inequality as the education
premium and the Gini income coe¢ cient fall relative to the baseline case, 1.68 and 0.242
respectively. The larger number of more productive workers increases output level by 3% in
the long run.31
In the second experiment, we consider the consequences of a policy that leads to a decrease
in college study time from 4 to 3 years. It is assumed that college graduates are able to
complete the four-year college program in three years. Hence, by decreasing the number of
years of forgone labor earnings, such a policy implies smaller costs of attending college. In
this sense, it is similar to the experiment with a tuition subsidy. Indeed, as Table 12 shows,
the results between the two policy experiments are quantitatively very similar: in the medium
31In the model, the e⁄ect of the change in tuition cost on the enrollment rate is small. This implication
of the model is consistent with the general equilibrium analysis in Heckman et al. (1998a). They ￿nd that
the increase in tuition cost by about a third decreases the average probability of going to college by 0.08. In
our model the corresponding decrease in probability is even smaller, 0.02. We conjecture that the di⁄erence
in the results is due to the redistribution of hours worked across workers in our model, whereas in Heckman
et al. (1998a) hours are supplied inelastically.
28run, working hours are redistributed from schooled to unschooled workers; in the long run,
the redistribution of total hours is reversed as the fraction of college graduates rises. The
economy achieves lower wage and income inequality and higher long-run output.
In our last experiment, we consider policies that improve the e¢ ciency of the schooling
system and lead to a higher performance on the cognitive ability test. We focus on policies
that typically do not require an increase in public spending. Examples of such policies include
designing a system of graduation tests, advancing homework and grading standards, and
facilitating more competition among schools.32 In the experiment, we assume that realized
de-meaned AFQT scores in the model are 1 point (0.04 of standardized AFQT score) higher
than in the benchmark 2002 model. As a result, more individuals qualify to go (and ￿nish)
college, so that the enrollment rate increases. Hence, this e⁄ect represents a pure shift in the
supply of schooled workers. This change a⁄ects the economy only in the long run, when the
fraction of schooled workers increases from 26.7% to 27.3%. As Table 12 demonstrates, even
such a small increase in test performance has non-trivial e⁄ects on output and inequality.
The wage premium goes down from 1.75 to 1.73 and output increases by 1%.
In sum, a more e⁄ective school system (on the pre-college or college level) leads to an
increase in the supply of schooled hours resulting in an unambiguous decrease in wage and
income inequality and an increase in long-run output.
6. Conclusion
In recent years macroeconomic theory has had great success in matching the historical secular
increases in relative wages and hours of schooled and unshooled male workers. This paper
undertakes the next natural step and asks: What are the e⁄ects of various government policies
on the economy-wide di⁄erences in wages, income, working hours and savings? In answering
this question we build a framework siutable for policy analysis, which we then use to conduct
some proposed policy experiments. One of the main roles in driving the demand in the labor
market in the data has been attributed to skill-biased technological change. This paper ￿lls
the gap in that literature by building an empirically sound general equilibrium model of
aggregate supply in the labor and investment markets.
Our battery of policy experiments highlights the importance of modeling education choice
32Betts and Ferrall (1997) argue that, given little evidence on the bene￿ts from increasing school spending,
the more promising type of reforms for public schools in the U.S. and Canada may be changing the incentive
structure for public schools.
29and labor supply for gauging the e⁄ects of policy change on wage inequality and output.
Table 13 summarizes medium and long-run responses in the number of college graduates,
wage inequality and output level to policy reforms in our model. Even though the reforms
are quite di⁄erent, two regularities stand out. First, the long-run reallocation of the workforce
between unschooled and schooled jobs can be quite substantial, reaching on several occasions
a million or more workers. The response is caused by the di⁄erential e⁄ect of policy change on
the lifetime income, consumption and leisure streams of schooled and unschooled individuals.
Typically a policy change operates through the redistribution of income or through its e⁄ect
on the accumulation of the skill-intensive capital stock.
The second common feature across the reforms is the e⁄ect of the workforce reallocation
on wage inequality and the output level. Here we distinguish between medium and long-
run e⁄ects of the policy change, depending on whether the change in the overall fraction of
schooled workers in the employed population adjusts. As Table 13 demonstrates, a larger
supply of schooled worker-hours and a smaller supply of unschooled worker-hours reverses
(most of the time) the medium-run e⁄ect on wage inequality. The output level receives
an additional change of 1 to 2% due to the di⁄erent number of workers in more and less
productive jobs.
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32Table 1: Working time decomposition for 1961 and 2002
1961 2002 change1
Working hours per capita 33.0 29.9 -3.1
Fraction of employed in population, % 81.7 75.3 -6.4
Fraction of schooled in
employed population, % 12.3 29.3 17.0
Workweek length, schooled2 44.5 43.2 -1.3
Workweek length, unschooled2 39.8 38.3 -1.5
Education premium 1.43 1.80 26.1
Note: 1change is given as a di⁄erence from 1961 to 2002, except for education premium (in %).
2Workweek length is calculated assuming 100 hours a week available for work.
33Table 2: Changes in labor supply and earnings inequality for 1961, 1980, and 2002 by gender
and education group.
Males Females
1961-1980 1980-2002 1961-1980 1980-2002
Working hours per capita1 -3.4 0.3 4.5 5.2
Fraction of schooled in
employed population2 9.4 7.6 6.8 12.7
Wage, schooled3 32.4 30.3 20.0 41.5
Wage, unschooled3 37.0 0.10 38.9 23.1
Education premium3 -3.3 30.1 -13.6 15.0
Note: 1in hours per week, 2in percentage points, 3in percent.
34Table 3: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Source or Moment
Elasticity of substitution between
unschooled hours and equipment, ￿ 0:693 Wage-bill ratio growth, 1961-2002
Elasticity of substitution between
schooled hours and equipment, ￿ ￿0:536 Labor share growth, 1961-2002
Share of unschooled hours, ￿u 0:467 Wage-bill ratio, 1961
Share of schooled hours, ￿k 0:479 Labor share, 1961
Share of structures, ￿ 0:230 NIPA Structures-to-Equipment, 1961
Labour-e¢ ciency, AS 118 Real GDP, 1961
Depreciation rate of structures, ￿s
Depreciation rate of equipment, ￿eq
0:05
0:125
Krusell et al. (2000)
Life length, I 1 54 Life expectancy at age 15 in 1980, Arias (2004)
Mandatory retirement age, Ir
1 47
Time at school, Ie 4
Discount factor, ￿ 0:96 Real interest rate is 4%
Elasticity of labor supply, ￿ 1:60 Workweek length of schooled, 1961
Education cost, fdmax; ￿dg f25:09 ; 5:00g Model ￿ts quality-adjusted equipment
stock, given fraction of schooled in
employed population, in 1961 and 2002
Note: 1 A newborn individual in the model corresponds to a 18 year old individual in the data.
35Table 4: Tax function: parameter estimates
Parameter 1961 2002
Federal a0 0.057 0.007
Income a1; ￿10￿5 0.231 0.306
Taxes a2; ￿10￿10 -0.257 -0.414
a3; ￿10￿15 0.246 0.348
a4; ￿10￿20 -0.107 -0.134
a5; ￿10￿25 0.016 0.019
R2 0.33 0.52
State taxes and txst 0.04 0.05
Social Security taxes txss 0.06 0.12
Note: The federal tax function is estimated by regressing the average federal income tax rate on the
polynomial of degree ￿ve in the disposable income:
















The social security tax function follows:
￿ss (y) =
￿
0:7 (txRetirement + txother SS)
0:7 (txRetirement ￿
￿ yRetirement






36Table 5: Estimating the e⁄ect of ability on college completion





Note: We restrict the NLSY79 sample to white males who took the ASVAB tests and who were not
in college in 1979. For each individual in this sample we document her highest grade completed as
of May 1, 1988. Let HGRi be equal to 1 if individual i￿ s highest grade completed was 4 or more







where the probit is de￿ned as vi= F
￿1 (Pr(HGRi) = 1), F is the c.d.f. of a standard normal













i is the raw (de-meaned by age) AFQT score.
Table 6: Exogenous factors in the model
1961 2002 change
Capital-embodied progress, q 0.96 0.26 -73%
TFP, A 1 1.50 50%
Average e⁄ective tax rate, ￿ (￿) see Figure 8
Consumption taxes, ￿c 6.5% 4.8% -1.7%pt






Source data: National Income and Product Accounts, the College Board￿ s publication ￿Trends in
College Pricing 2005￿ .
37Table 7: Benchmark model vs data in 1961 and 2002
1961 2002
Data Model Data Model
Workweek length, schooled1 44.5 (￿)44.5 43.2 40.7
Workweek length, unschooled1 39.8 38.5 38.3 32.6
Education premium 1.43 1.42 1.80 1.75
Capital-output ratio 2.30 2.56 2.43 2.50
Fraction of schooled workers
in employed population, % 12.3 (￿)12.3 29.3 26.7
Output2 1.00 1.01 2.26 1.86
Note: * denotes moments matched directly by calibration. 1Workweek length is calculated assuming
100 hours in a week available for work. 2Output is normalized to 1.00 for 1961.
Table 8: E⁄ect of technological change and education choice in the model




B. No change in
schooled fraction
Workweek length, schooled1 44.5 40.7 42.8 41.8
Workweek length, unschooled1 38.5 32.6 35.3 33.8
Wages, schooled 15.5 33.5 15.9 42.2
Wages, unschooled 10.9 19.2 10.8 17.1
Education premium 1.42 1.75 1.48 2.47
Gini coe¢ cient 0.204 0.249 0.216 0.314
Capital-output ratio 2.56 2.50 2.52 2.38
Fraction of schooled workers
in employed population, % 12.3 26.7 10.7 12.3
Output2 1.00 1.85 0.91 1.55
Note: In experiment A, we simulate a steady state equilibrium for the year 2002 keeping the level of
embodied and neutral technological change at 1961 level. In experiment B, the fraction of schooled
in employed population is kept at its 1961 level.
1Workweek length is calculated assuming 100 hours in a week available for work. 2Output is
normalized to 1.00 in 1961 model.
38Table 9: Income tax reforms




B. Income tax cut
by 19%
Medium run Long run Medium run Long run
Mean marginal tax rate, schooled1 24.6 19.5 19.5 20.0 19.9
Mean marginal tax rate, unschooled1 23.9 19.5 19.5 19.4 19.4
Workweek length, schooled2 40.7 41.5 41.4 41.7 41.6
Workweek length, unschooled2 32.6 34.2 34.1 34.2 34.1
Wages, schooled 33.5 34.2 33.5 34.3 33.7
Wages, unschooled 19.2 19.3 19.6 19.3 19.6
Education premium 1.75 1.77 1.71 1.77 1.72
Gini taxable income 0.249 0.263 0.256 0.251 0.246
Capital-output ratio 2.50 2.55 2.57 2.57 2.58
Fraction of schooled workers
in employed population, % 26.7 26.7 28.7 26.7 28.3
Output3 1.00 1.04 1.06 1.05 1.06
Note: In experiment A, the progressive income tax function is replaced with a (revenue neutral)
proportional income tax rate. In experiment B, average and marginal tax rates are multiplied by
0.808. The fraction of schooled workers in the employed population is ￿xed in the medium run, and
is endogenous in the long run.
1The marginal tax rate of the mean income individual in the group. 2Workweek length is calculated
assuming 100 hours in a week available for work. 3Output in the 2002 model is normalized to 1.00.
39Table 10: Inreasing viability of the pension fund
Model Model Experiments with 2030 Model
2002 2030
A. Increase




from 64 to 70
Medium run Long run Medium run Long run
Ret. bene￿ts to wage income1,
schooled 0.21 0.10 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21
unschooled 0.45 0.21 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45
Workweek length, schooled2 40.7 43.4 42.9 43.0 40.3 40.4
Workweek length, unschooled2 32.6 35.9 35.1 35.2 32.6 32.6
Wages, schooled 33.5 33.7 32.8 33.2 33.0 33.2
Wages, unschooled 19.2 19.9 19.6 19.5 19.8 19.6
Education premium 1.75 1.70 1.67 1.70 1.67 1.69
Gini coe¢ cient 0.249 0.282 0.271 0.275 0.233 0.236
Capital-output ratio 2.50 2.64 2.54 2.53 2.57 2.56
Fraction of schooled workers
in employed population, % 26.7 29.7 29.7 28.7 29.7 28.9
Output3 0.87 1.00 0.97 0.96 0.91 0.90
Note: The 2030 steady state corresponds to the steady state in the benchmark 2002 model with life
length increased from 71 to 78 to capture population aging. In experiment A, the social security
tax rate in 2030 model is increased by 7%. In experiment B, the retirement age in 2030 model is
increased from 64 to 70 years of age. In both experiments, the ratio of individual retirement bene￿ts
to wage income is the same as in the 2002 model without population aging (0.21 - schooled, 0.45 -
unschooled).
1The ratio of the mean annual retirement bene￿ts to the mean annual wage income for a retiree
in the group. 2Workweek length is calculated assuming 100 hours in a week available for work.
3Output in the 2030 model is normalized to 1.00.
40Table 11: Eliminating redistribution of retirement bene￿ts








Medium run Long run Medium run Long run
Ret. bene￿ts to wage income1,
schooled 0.21 0.34 0.34 0 0
unschooled 0.45 0.34 0.34 0 0
Workweek length, schooled2 40.7 40.6 40.6 41.4 41.4
Workweek length, unschooled2 32.6 32.6 32.6 33.7 33.6
Wages, schooled 33.5 33.6 33.5 34.4 34.1
Wages, unschooled 19.2 19.2 19.2 19.4 19.6
Education premium 1.75 1.75 1.74 1.77 1.74
Gini coe¢ cient 0.249 0.247 0.246 0.248 0.244
Capital-output ratio 2.50 2.51 2.51 2.59 2.60
Fraction of schooled workers
in employed population, % 26.7 26.7 26.9 26.7 27.7
Output3 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.04 1.05
Note: In experiment A, retirement bene￿ts (as a share of wage income) are the same for all retirees
and equal to those for mean wage income individual in 2002 model. In experiment B, the social
security tax rate and retirement bene￿ts are zero. The fraction of schooled workers in the employed
population is ￿xed in the medium run, and is endogenous in the long run.
1The ratio of the mean annual retirement bene￿ts to the mean annual wage income for a retiree
in the group. 2Workweek length is calculated assuming 100 hours in a week available for work.
3Output in the 2002 model is normalized to 1.00.
41Table 12: Adjustments of the schooling system







from 4 to 3 years
C. Improvement












Workweek length, schooled1 40.7 39.8 39.6 39.4 39.2 40.7
Workweek length, unschooled1 32.6 33.2 33.0 33.2 33.0 32.6
Wages, schooled 33.5 33.9 32.9 34.1 32.9 33.3
Wages, unschooled 19.2 19.1 19.6 19.1 19.6 19.3
Education premium 1.75 1.77 1.68 1.78 1.68 1.73
Gini coe¢ cient 0.249 0.252 0.242 0.245 0.234 0.247
Capital-output ratio 2.50 2.51 2.53 2.51 2.54 2.51
Fraction of schooled workers
in employed population, % 26.7 26.7 29.7 26.7 30.2 27.3
Output2 1.00 1.00 1.03 0.99 1.03 1.01
Note: In experiment A, college tuition is fully subsidized. In experiment B, the number of years it
takes to graduate from college is decreased from 4 to 3 years. In experiment C, the realized raw
AFQT scores in the model are 1 point (or 0.04 of standardized AFQT score) higher than in the
benchmark 2002 model. The fraction of schooled workers in the employed population is ￿xed in the
medium run, and is endogenous in the long run.
1Workweek length is calculated assuming 100 hours in a week available for work. 2Output in the
2002 model is normalized to 1.00.







Switch to proportional income tax +2.1 (0.0) ￿ 2.1 (+1.6) +6.3 (+4.3)
Income tax cut by 19% +1.6 (0.0) ￿ 1.3 (+1.6) +6.4 (+4.8)
Change in retirement system
Increase in SS tax by 7 percentage points ￿ 1.1 (0.0) +0.4 (￿ 1.4) ￿ 4.4 (￿ 3.4)
Increase in retirement age from 64 to 70 ￿ 0.8 (0.0) ￿ 0.2 (￿ 1.6) ￿ 10.0 (￿ 9.4)
Equal retirment payments +0.2 (0.0) ￿ 0.3 (+0.1) +0.2 (￿ 0.0)
Switch to fully-funded SS system +1.1 (0.0) ￿ 0.4 (+1.5) +5.2 (+4.2)
E¢ ciency of the schooling system
Full tuition subsidy +3.1 (0.0) ￿ 3.7 (+1.5) +2.8 (+0.0)
Decrease in schooling time from 4 to 3 years +3.5 (0.0) ￿ 4.1 (+2.0) +2.6 (￿ 0.5)
Improvement in ability by +1 AFQT point +0.7 (0.0) ￿ 1.2 (0.0) +0.6 (0.0)
Note: The table compares the e⁄ect of government policies on the fraction of schooled workers in the
employed population, education premium, and output in the long run and (in parentheses) in the
medium run. The fraction of schooled workers in the employed population is ￿xed in the medium
run, and is endogenous in the long run.
1percentage points change, 2percent change.
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48Appendix A: Data sources
All the labor data, including wage data, are taken from the March Supplement of the Current
Population Survey (CPS). We also used CPS data for federal, state, and social security taxes
and income for the year 2003 to determine coe¢ cients of the tax function.
We downloaded the following variables from the IPUMS-CPS home at www.ipums.org/cps
for the 1962 to 2003 surveys (Miriam King, Steven Ruggles, Trent Alexander, Donna Leicach,
and Matthew Sobek. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population Survey:
Version 2.0. [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center
[producer and distributor], 2004).
Table A1: CPS variables used.
Variable Content Restrictions used
LABOR and INCOME data
perwt frequency weight
year year of survey
age age 16-64
sex gender male
educrec educational attainment record grades >=1
empstat employment status employed / employed at work
classwkr class of worker control for self employment
wkswork1 weeks worked last year 1976 to 2003
wkswork2 weeks worked last year (intervalled) 1962 to 1975
hrswork hours worked last week
inctot total income last year
incwage total wage income last year
TAX data
adjginc adjusted gross income 0<adjginc<999801
fedtax federal income tax liability fedtax>0
￿ca social security retirement payroll ￿ca>0
deduction
statetax state income tax liability statetax>0
To determine the relevant capital stock, output and income data we used the following
49tables from the National Income and Product accounts as supplied by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (from http://www.bea.gov/ downloaded between January and March 2006). We
downloaded the tables for the year 1960 to 2002 at the annual rate.
Aside from this we have to adjust our wage income data for wage supplements. To get
the right adjustment factor we make use of both the income side of the national accounts
and a detailed listing of the wage supplements as provided by the BEA. The income side is
also used to determine the capital income share in GDP.
Table A2: NIPA tables used.
Table Content
National GDP accounts
1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product Nominal
1.10 Gross Domestic Income Nominal
1.1.4. Price Indices for GDP Base 2000
2.7. Investment in Private Fixed Assets, Historical-Cost
Equipment and Software, and Structures by Type
2.8. Investment in Private Fixed Assets, Chain-Type Quantity Indices
Equipment and Software, and Structures by Type
Fixed assets accounts
2.1. Private Fixed Assets, Equipment and Software, Current-Cost Net Stock
and Structures by Type
2.2. Price indices for Net Stock of Private Fixed Assets, Chain-Type Quantity Indices
Equipment and Software, and Structures by Type
Wage supplements
7.8 Supplements to wages and salaries by type Nominal
For capital equipment from 1963 to 1992 we make use of the time series provided by
KORV. We use a suggestion by Robert Gordon to extend the series from 1992 to 2000.
Concerning the tax data:
Federal taxes: Statistics of Income, 1961 (2002); Individual Income Tax Returns for 1961
(2002), Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Treasury Department Publication.
State taxes: State Tax Handbook 1964 (2002), CCH Editorial Sta⁄ Publication, Com-
merce Clearing House Inc., New York, Chicago, Washington, Boston, Philadelphia, Los An-
geles, San Francisco.
50Consumption taxes and social security taxes for 1961 and 2002: We used
the SourceOECD, OECD database to get the expenditure and income side
of the National Accounts as well as the consumption taxes and social secu-
rity contributions from the Revenue Statistics. The data were downloaded in
March 2006 at <http://titania.sourceoecd.org/vl=12670625/cl=17/nw=1/rpsv/cgi-
bin/jsearch_oecd_stats>.
The data on tuition and fees of full time undergraduate students was taken from the
College Board￿ s web page. In particular it was taken from their publication ￿Trends in
College Pricing 2005￿ . We took a weighted average of the private and public universities
student tuition and fees series (0:2 tuitionprivate + 0:8 tuitionpublic): To extend the series back
prior to 1976, we used the growth trend from 1976 to 1980.
51Appendix B: Data transformation
B.1 Labor variables
For all the variables generated we restricted our sample to the male age 16 to 64 population.
Furthermore, we de￿ned college graduates (CG) to be all persons in the sample, that has at
least 4 years of college completed. We de￿ne as less than college graduates (LC) all students
that have either 1 to 12 years of highschool or 1 to 3 years of college. All the time series
generated are generated for the respective groups.
For the work related variables, we also restrict our attention to the persons actually at
work during the last week.
For the arti￿cial cohort generation we make use of the age variable by looking at all the
work variables for the respective groups and subdevide the education groups by age in 1 or
5 year steps depending on the context.
From the IPUMS samples, we determined the following for all years from 1961 to 2002:
Table B1: CPS data generated.
Name Content Variables used Operation on sample
wap Working age population perwt sum
emp Employment empstat, perwt sum
hours(ave) Average annual hours1 empstat, perwt, average(wksworkX*
wksworkX, hrswork hrswork)
hours(med) Median annual hours empstat, perwt, median(wksworkX*
wksworkX, hrswork hrswork)
wph(ave) Average wage per hour2 empstat, perwt, incwage average(incwage/
wksworkX, hrswork wksworkX*hrswork)
wph(med) Median wage per hour empstat, perwt, incwage median(incwage/
wksworkX, hrswork wksworkX*hrswork)
Inc Total income before taxes inctot median for each group
For the hours calculation from 1962 to 1975, we had to transform the intervalled weeks
52worked per year into representative weeks worked. We did this with the following mapping:
wks=9 if weeks worked in 1 to 13
wks=22 if weeks worked in 14 to 26
wks=34 if weeks worked in 27 to 39
wks=43 if weeks worked in 40 to 47
wks=48 if weeks worked in 48 to 49
wks=52 if weeks worked in 50 to 52.
We choose this mapping based on the post 1975 data. For the late period we have both
the actual number of weeks worked and the intervalled weeks worked. To ￿nd the right
weights we determine the median hours worked in each intervall.
Based on these primary results we determined the following objects for each education
group:
emp fraction with college graduates =
emp[S]
emp[S + U]
total hours fraction of college graduates =
emp[S] ￿ hours[i]




where the square brackets represent the restriction to a subgroup (college graduates or less
than college graduates). The adjustment factor 5200 in average hours worked is used to
normalize the annual hours worked to the intervall zero one.
To make the wage data comparable, we used the consumption de￿ ator from NIPA table
1.1.4.
B.2 Capital stocks
For the construction of the structures capital stocks we used the nominal private and resi-





As a ￿nal step we transformed the variable into per working age terms by deviding the




For the construction of equipment capital stocks we are starting under the assumption
that Gordon (1990) and subsequently KORV did a good job when determining the quality
component of capital equipment and we could use their quality adjustment factor from 1963
to 1992. For the period before we assumed that their was little to no quality adjustment
necessary. For the period after 1992 we followed Grodon￿ s suggestion that the BEA did a
good job on capturing the quality adjustment for computers and that for the other equipment
the missed quality part amounted to 1.5%.3 We made the appropriate adjustments to the
de￿ ators and spliced the resulting q series with that from KORV.
As ￿rst step, we calculated the shares in private equipment using the following group-
ings: Information processing equipment and software (Computers and peripheral equipment,
Software, Communication equipment, Medical equipment and instruments, Nonmedical in-
struments, Photocopy and related equipment, O¢ ce and accounting equipment), Industrial
equipment, Transportation equipment, Other equipment.
The only bigger catergory we split is Information processing equipment and software.
This is necessary since the computer part includes quality adjustment in its de￿ ator while
the other sub-catergories don￿ t.
3The approach has also been used in Greenwood et al. (1997).





























here si stands for the share in total non-residential investment, di stands for the NIPA
investment de￿ ator (or if stated the Thoern / consumption de￿ ator), and ~ di stands for the
adjusted de￿ ator.
The NIPA q is di⁄erent from the KORV q so that we have to make an ajustment. we
splice the two series together assuming, that KORV is correct and get the adjusted ~ qNIPA.
Then we determine the equipment de￿ ator the following way: ~ dThoern = ~ qNIPA ￿dconsumption.







One implicit assumption we are making is that the residential equipment exhibits the
same quality change as the non-residential equipment.
B.3 Taxes
The micro regression results for the income tax functions for 1961 and 2002 are provided by
the Statistics of Income division of the Internal Revenue Agency. They used the respective
years tax return froms to regress the e⁄ective income tax rate paid on the respective taxable
income. We restricted the regression such that the income was between 3000 and 300000
year-2002 US$. The lower bound takes the tax-exempted income into account and the upper
bound re￿ ects the fact that the median person does not exceed that income in any given
year of his life. Furthermore we restriced the average income tax rate to be between zero and
5570%, excluding the boundary points.
The consumption taxes were taken from Mendoza, Rasin, and Tesar as provided on Men-
doza￿ s web page: <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/econ/mendoza/pdfs/newtaxdata.pdf>.
We used SourceOECD data on expenditures and tax revenues to ex-
tend the series forward to 2004. The data were downloaded in March
2006 at <http://titania.sourceoecd.org/vl=12670625/cl=17/nw=1/rpsv/cgi-
bin/jsearch_oecd_stats>. Finally, to get coverage of the early period for the consumption
tax we had to extend the series using the trend of a consumption tax rate series estimated
based on consumption expenditures from the BEA-NIPA together with Indirect Business
Taxes net of Subsidies.
56Appendix C: Armed Forces Quali￿cation Test in
NLSY79
ASVAB Administration: During the summer and fall of 1980, NLSY79 respondents par-
ticipated in an e⁄ort of the U.S. Departments of Defense and Military Services to update
the norms of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)1. The Department
of Defense and Congress, after questioning the appropriateness of using the World War II
reference population as the primary basis for interpreting the enlistment test scores of con-
temporary recruits, decided in 1979 to conduct this new study. NLSY79 respondents were
selected since they comprised a pre-existing nationally representative sample of young people
born during the period 1957 through 1964. This testing, which came to be referred to as the
￿Pro￿le of American Youth,￿was conducted by NORC representatives according to standard
ASVAB procedural guidelines; respondents were paid $50 for their participation. Groups of
￿ve to ten persons were tested at more than 400 test sites, including hotels, community
centers, and libraries throughout the United States and abroad. A total of 11,914 civilian
and military NLSY79 respondents (or 94% of the 1979 sample) completed this test: 5,766 or
94.4% of the cross-sectional sample, 4,990 or 94.2% of the supplemental sample, and 1,158
or 90.5% of the military sample.
The ASVAB consists of a battery of 10 tests that measure knowledge and skill in the fol-
lowing areas: (1) general science; (2) arithmetic reasoning; (3) word knowledge; (4) paragraph
comprehension; (5) numerical operations; (6) coding speed; (7) auto and shop information;
(8) mathematics knowledge; (9) mechanical comprehension; and (10) electronics information.
The following variables are available for each youth tested: raw scores, scale scores, standard
errors, sampling weight, high school graduation status, and whether the test was completed
under normal or altered testing conditions.
A composite score derived from select sections of the battery can be used to construct an
approximate and uno¢ cial Armed Forces Quali￿cations Test score (AFQT) for each youth.
The AFQT is a general measure of trainability and a primary criterion of enlistment eligibility
for the Armed Forces. Two methods of calculating AFQT scores, developed by the U.S.
Department of Defense, have been used to create two percentile scores, an AFQT80 and
an AFQT89, for each Pro￿les respondent. To construct AFQT80, the raw scores from the
following four sections of the ASVAB are summed: Section 2 (arithmetic reasoning), Section
1This excerpt is taken from BLS￿ "NLYS79 User￿ s Guide 1979-2002", Chapter 4, pages 95-96,
<http://www.bls.gov/nls/79guide/2002/nls79g4a.pdf>.
573 (word knowledge), Section 4 (paragraph comprehension), and one half of the score from
Section 5 (numerical operations). Beginning in January 1989, the Department of Defense
began using a new calculation procedure. Creation of this revised percentile score, called
AFQT89, involves (1) computing a verbal composite score by summing word knowledge and
paragraph comprehension raw scores; (2) converting subtest raw scores for verbal, math
knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning; (3) multiplying the verbal standard score by two; (4)
summing the standard scores for verbal, math knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning; and (5)
converting the summed standard score to a percentile.
58Appendix D: Finding the equilibrium











a=1;X=fS,Ug, Y ,Kst,Keq,",LS,LU, transfers to retirees TRss, residual transfers TR, and
prices r,rst,req,wS,wU that satisfy the system of 393 equations below, given relative price
of equipment q, productivity A, tuition cost N, income tax function T (￿), and government
purchases G.
First introduce the following additional variables and notation (X = fS;Ug whenever
applicable):
- taxable income of age a individual: yX
a = wXlX
a ￿ NX + (rs ￿ ￿s)kX
a ; a = 1;:::;I
- marginal tax rate of age a individual: ￿X




; a = 1;:::;I



























; a = 2;:::;I
- labor market equations:
l
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a)wS; a = Ie + 1;:::;Ir
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- budget constraints of age a individual:
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; A = 2;:::;I
59- arbitrage conditions:
r













- working time constraints for individuals at college:
l
S
a = 0; a = 1;:::;Ie
- working time constraints for individuals at college:
l
X
a = 0; a = Ir + 1;:::;I
































































































































































































- market clearing conditions:
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